In a two-task team project with observable task outcomes, optimal incentives prioritize tasks differently depending on task externalities. When the tasks are independent, Principal follows a decreasing order by placing more essential task first. A task is more essential if its failure compromises the overall project's chance of success from a task-specific cutoff level by a greater percentage. This definition has no systematic relations to the variance of task outcomes. In particular, a more risky task can be less essential or more essential.
Introduction
Innovation is a process of trial and error. A medical research firm launching a project for the discovery of a drug has to worry about not only achieving a cure for a disease, it has to make sure that the drug does not have other adverse medical effects for it to be approved by the FDA.
In addition, the take-up cost of the drug has to be reasonable for ultimate business success.
Various aspects of a project can thus be compartmentalized into individual tasks. Besides the discovery of drugs, similar description applies to any technological discovery.
Barring a natural ordering in a subset of the tasks for the planned project, there could be rooms for flexibility in which order to execute some of the other tasks. For instance, in the drug discovery example a research team may present one of several alternative drug options for FDA approval, but even before one comes to that stage the team may be experimenting in developing alternative viable solutions before presenting its best case scenario to the FDA. If one submission fails to receive the approval, another solution can be presented improving the overall chance of the application's success.
It will be assumed that the project in question will succeed for sure if all component tasks succeed but its chance of success still remains positive if some but not all of the tasks fail. The firm has to contract out these tasks to a group of experts. We approach this exercise as a typical moral hazard in teams problem with sequential tasks. If the task sequence can be freely chosen and task outcomes can be observed as the project progresses, the principal (or the firm) has to decide in which order to undertake the various tasks. We raise a number of scenarios and ask some related questions, as follows: (i) Some tasks' failure means the overall project's chance of success gets compromised much more than the failure in other tasks. Should the former tasks be labeled as more essential in the sense that these should have greater priorities?
(ii) Suppose the tasks are interdependent. Say, success in task 1 improves the chance of task 2's success much more than the other way around. Then task 1 has a greater impact than task 2. Which of the two criteria -impact and essentiality -has higher significance in the principal's design of incentives? (iii) Should the principal place more essential tasks first or the one with bigger impact?
(iv) Also, should a more risky task be placed early or late in the order? What are the relations between riskiness, impact and essentiality?
(vi) How do the principal's decisions differ from the social planner's optimal decisions?
In team moral hazard problems with sequential tasks but intermediate task outcomes not observable, Winter (2006) had observed that more essential tasks should be placed towards the end of the production chain. The analysis in this paper broadens the meaning of essential tasks and brings in other considerations that are relevant for task ordering in teams. Under appropriate conditions our results do not always agree with Winter's observation.
Consider a project that involves 2 sequential tasks, carried out by 2 agents. Each agent performs one task. For his task, an agent decides whether to exert effort or not. Any agent's cost of effort for either task is c. Effort decision yields either success or failure. Without effort, task 1 is completed successfully with probability α 1 ∈ (0, 1), but with effort the task succeeds with probability β 1 ∈ (α 1 , 1). Similarly, without effort Task 2 only succeeds with probability α 2 ∈ (0, 1) but with effort this probability increases to β 2 ∈ (α 2 , 1). Denote the task ordering by (i, j), (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. We assume that agent j (assigned to task j, moving second in the sequence) observes only the outcome of task i and not the effort decision of the first mover.
In addition to the task success probabilities α and β, we consider the case where the failure of an agent at his task has an impact on the overall success of the grand project. Specifically, if both tasks are successful then the project ends successfully; if task k fails while task l succeeds, then the project succeeds with probability γ k ; and if both tasks fail, then the project fails.
We can then think of task k being more important than task l in that γ k < γ l . To illustrate, consider the extreme case of γ k = 0: this means that task k is absolutely crucial, as failure in this task leads the whole project to fail.
The principal receives the value v if the project succeeds and 0 if the project fails. The rewards (v i , v j ) are as follows. If player i (assigned to task i) succeeds in his task, then he receives the reward v i (S i ), and v i (F i ) if his task fails. As for player j, if he succeeds in his task, then he receives v j (·, S j ), and if he fails his reward is v j (·, F j ). Note that either reward applies regardless of the outcome of the task assigned to the other player.
The project, denoted as game G, proceeds as follows. Player i chooses effort e i , with which he either successfully completes task i (denoted as outcome S i ), or fails to complete it (outcome F i ). Upon observing S i , Player j chooses effort e j (S i ), and upon observing F i Player j also chooses effort e j (F i ). The principal aims to set the optimal effort inducements v and the optimal ordering of tasks. Except for their task assignment, both players are identical, so in the following analysis what matters is the ordering of tasks and not the assignment of players to a slot in the sequence.
Given this, we can use "task i" and "player i" interchangeably.
Consider two cases, namely Cases A and B. In both Case A and B, Player i exerts effort.
The difference is that in Case A, Player j exerts effort regardless of the outcome of Player i's task, whereas in Case B, Player j exerts effort if and only if task i succeeds. In other words, the principal employs a contingent plan for task j in Case B but not in Case A. Denote an ordering with a contingent plan for the second task by (i, j), and an ordering without it by (i, j).
Immediately we see that it is optimizing for the principal to pay an agent nothing if he fails.
To see this, incentive compatibility requires that, for player i,
Case A. Consider the subgame that begins at Player j's decision node following F i . At this decision node, Player j decides between e j = 1 and e j = 0. Call this subgame G(F i ). Recall our assumption that v j (·, F j ) = 0. Given F i , Player j chooses e j = 1 if and only if
Next consider the subgame G(S i ). Here, Player j chooses e j = 1 if and only if
Finally, consider the effort decision of Player i. Recall that we assume v i (F i ) = 0. Player i chooses e i = 1 if and only if
The optimal rewards v * satisfy (1), (2), and (3). Player i's expected utility is
and Player j's expected utility is
The Principal's expected profit is
these rewards when a contingent plan for j is employed. We assume that v j (·, F j ) = 0. Consider again the subgame G(F i ). Since e j = 0 involves zero cost, individual rationality together with the aim of implementing zero effort at least cost imply that the reward to the Player j when his task is successfully completed following e j = 0 (and Player i has failed) is
where we use v j (·,
Finally, consider the effort decision of Player i. As with Case A, we use v i (F i ) = 0. Player i chooses e i = 1 if and only if
The optimal rewards v * satisfy (7), (8), and (9). Player i's expected utility is
while Player j's expected utility is
The Principal might prefer not to incentivize effort from Player j following failure in task i if the probability that the project succeeds given this failure is too low for the effort cost to be worthwhile. This is easiest to see in the extreme case of γ i = 0: failure in task i results in failure of the entire project for certain following which the best action would be to terminate the project.
We see thatγ i ≤ 1 if and only if
Comment 2: Let the task ordering be (i, j). Suppose that the player assigned to task i is induced to exert effort, and that the player assigned to task j is induced to exert effort following success by Player i. The Principal prefers not to incentivize effort from Player j following failure
Fix α, β, c and v. We see thatγ i is increasing in γ j .
Proposition 1 Let the task ordering be (i, j), and define the 'threshold value' of task i to bē
Effort is exerted in task i, which can either succeed or fail.
(i) If γ i ≥γ i for i = 1, 2, then inducing effort in the task j regardless of the outcome of task i is optimal, and (1, 2) ∼ (2, 1).
(ii) If γ 1 <γ 1 and γ 2 ≥γ 2 , then the optimal ordering is (1, 2).
(iii) If γ 1 ≥γ 1 and γ 2 <γ 2 , then the optimal ordering is (2, 1).
(iv) If γ i <γ i for i = 1, 2, then the optimal ordering is (1, 2) provided that
and the optimal ordering is (2, 1) provided that
Otherwise, either (1, 2) or (2, 1) is optimal.
Corollary 1 Suppose the two tasks are identical in every respect except for γ 1 , γ 2 . Moreover, suppose γ i <γ i , i = 1, 2. Then the optimal ordering is (1, 2) if γ 1 < γ 2 .
Graphically, if we take the point (γ 1 ,γ 2 ) and draw a horizontal line as well as a vertical line through it, then the result is a division of the set [0, 1] × [0, 1] into four sections or subsets, where the top-right section corresponds to Prop. 1(i), the top-left section to Prop. 1(ii), the lower-right section to Prop. 1 (iii) , and the lower-left section to Prop. 1 (iv) .
From Proposition 1 we see then that for task i to have an impact (i.e., task i's outcome influences the desired effort in task j), it must be that γ i <γ i ; otherwise, effort is incentivized in task j whether task i succeeds or not. One insight is that γ 1 being less than γ 2 does not automatically entail task 1's place ahead of task 2. If both γ values are above their thresholds, the ordering (1, 2) is as good as the ordering (2, 1) though γ 1 < γ 2 (see Example 1 below).
In fact, if γ 1 < γ 2 but γ 2 is below its threshold while γ 1 is not, then by Prop. 1(iii) task 2 should go first (Example 2). That said, the fact that a task's γ value is below its threshold is not sufficient for it to be placed first; whether the other task's γ is below its own threshold or not is also taken into account. Specifically, as case (iv) shows, when both tasks are below their respective thresholds, then some other factor comes into play, which is how far below one's threshold a task's γ value is relative to the other task.
To see this last point, consider again condition (15), which we rewrite here as
with k j denoting the right-hand side of (15). Given that both γ values are below their threshold values, task 1 goes first in the optimal task ordering if and only if this inequality holds. To illustrate, suppose that α and β probabilities are such that k j = 1, and that γ 1 < γ 2 . Then the inequality holds (thus the optimal task ordering is (1, 2)) if and only if γ 2 − γ 1 >γ 2 −γ 1 .
One can easily imagine other values k j for which (15) fails to hold although γ 1 < γ 2 . Satisfying condition (15) given a larger k j entails a steeper drop in γ 1 fromγ 1 . values. The task having the lower γ value need not be placed first in the task sequence. To illustrate, consider the area under the 45 • line, where γ 2 < γ 1 for any (γ 1 , γ 2 ). In the gray portion, γ 1 falls below its threshold while γ 2 does not, so task 1 is placed first although γ 2 < γ 1 .
Also note the olive green parallelogram in the bottom of the figure; here γ 2 is below its threshold value, however so is γ 1 , with the latter sufficiently belowγ 1 for condition (15) to hold, resulting in task 2 going last instead of first in the optimal task ordering. ||
Comparative statics
A change in β j and a reversal of the optimal preference ordering. Denote the initial optimal task ordering by (i, j) * . We see that
Therefore, an increase in β j (task ordered last in the optimal task ordering) decreasesγ i (threshold value of the task placed first in the optimal task ordering) with no accompanying change inγ j . Let the new threshold value of γ i beγ i , and suppose that γ j <γ j whileγ i ≤ γ i <γ i .
Then, with everything else constant, an increase in β j reverses the optimal ordering. Note that this may also result from an decrease in α j , since
Social planner's problem. Suppose that efforts were observable and enforceable. We show that the information asymmetry makes effort more costly to implement for the principal compared to the social planner, thus the latter would pursue later tasks more often than the principal. To see this, consider the case when task i has been successful. The social planner would push for effort in task j whenever the gain from effort does not fall below its cost, which in the social planner's case would be c. That is,
However, in the same situation the principal would induce effort if and only if
Clearly, if the principal finds it desirable to incentivize effort, then the social planner should do so as well (since β j β j −α j 1 > 1). But the converse need not be true.
The social planner seeks to maximize the surplus from implementing a particular task ordering. Any task ordering entails effort from the worker assigned to the first task; effort from the worker assigned to the second task may be contingent on first task success or not. We denote the surplus from a task ordering in which second-task effort is not contingent upon first-task outcomes as S(i, j), and the surplus when it is contingent on first-task success as S(i, j).
Comment: S(1, 2) = S(2, 1).
S(i, j) > S(i, j) if and only if
i.e.,
Proposition 2 Let the task ordering be (i, j), and define the 'threshold value' of task i for the social planner to beγ
(i) If γ i ≥γ SP i for i = 1, 2, then inducing effort in the task j regardless of the outcome of task i is optimal, and (1, 2) ∼ (2, 1).
(ii) If γ 1 <γ SP 1 and γ 2 ≥γ SP 2 , then the optimal ordering is (1, 2).
(iii) If γ 1 ≥γ SP 1 and γ 2 <γ SP 2 , then the optimal ordering is (2, 1).
(iv) If γ i <γ SP i for i = 1, 2, then the optimal ordering is (1, 2) provided that
Corollary 2 Suppose the two tasks are identical in every respect except for γ 1 , γ 2 . Moreover, suppose γ i <γ i , i = 1, 2. Then the optimal ordering is (1, 2) if γ 1 < γ 2 .
One case where the principal and the social planner would prefer different task orderings:
Suppose that γ 1 <γ SP 1 (this implies, given (20), that γ 1 <γ 1 ). Suppose further thatγ SP 1 ≤ γ 2 <γ 2 , and condition (16) is satisfied for the principal. Then the optimal tasking ordering for the social planner would be (1, 2) while the optimal ordering for the principal would be (2, 1).
Risks and task ordering. We now look at the implications of task riskiness on the optimal ordering of tasks. Specifically, note that effort increases the probability of task success but does not eliminate it: even with effort there remains some chance that the task will fail. If we take task performance (with effort exertion) to be a continuous random variable X ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) and calculate the probability of task success β as P(X >x) for somex in the support of the probability distribution, then we can use the variance of X as a measure of the riskiness of the task, with β in turn reflecting this riskiness. As the comparative statics shows, changes in β may affect the optimal task ordering. Thus we can see the effect of task riskiness, represented by the variance of the task performance X, on the optimal task ordering via its impact on β.
To simplify, suppose that both tasks initially have identical α, β, and γ values. It is easy to see thatγ i =γ j . Then by Proposition 1, either task ordering is optimal. Now suppose that performance in task 1 when effort is exerted is the random variable X 1 ∼ N (µ 1 , σ 2 1 ) and the performance in task 2 following positive effort is X 2 ∼ N (µ 1 , σ 2 2 ), where and µ 1 = µ 2 and σ 2 1 > σ 2 2 : the cdf F 2 is a mean-preserving spread of F 1 . To simplify, denote the common mean by µ.
Recall that β = P(X >x). It is easy to see that
for any cut-off valuex. As explained above, either task ordering is optimal in this case.
Returning to σ 2 1 > σ 2 2 , we now consider two cases. In the first case,x < µ. Note that
We see that ifx < µ, then ∂
Therefore, in this casex
Recall that when the tasks had the same variance, β 1 = β 2 , hence given the assumptions on the values of the other parameters (1, 2) ∼ (2, 1). But with an increase in task 1's riskiness, β 1 < β 2 . Using our comparative statics, we know that this fall in β 1 increasesγ 2 but leavesγ 1 unchanged. Denote this higher threshold byγ 2 .
Suppose that the (identical) γ values are at least as large as their initial threshold values.
Ifγ 2 ≤ γ 2 <γ 2 , then (2, 1) (1, 2), otherwise either ranking is optimal. Note that when the increase in task 1's riskiness results in a change in the principal's ranking of orderings, it is task 2 rather than task 1 that is placed ahead. Now suppose that the γ values fall below their initial thresholds. Recall Proposition 1 (iv) .
Note that when the tasks have the same variance,
thus (1, 2) ∼ (2, 1). However, an increase in task 1's riskiness decreases β 1 and increasesγ 2 . The latter decreases the left-hand side of the expression above while the former decreases the righthand side. Depending on which side falls faster, we have either (1, 2) (2, 1) or (2, 1) (1, 2).
Again, task 1, which is riskier, need not be placed first.
Now consider the second case ofx > µ. Now we see that
This time, the increase in riskiness increases β 1 , which in turn decreasesγ 2 ;γ 1 is unaffected.
Denote this lower threshold byγ 2 . Suppose that γ 1 ≥γ 1 and γ 2 ≥γ 2 ; since γ 2 ≥γ 2 >γ 2 , one would still have (1, 2) ∼ (2, 1). However, suppose γ 1 <γ 1 and γ 2 <γ 2 . There are two possibilities. The first isγ 2 ≤ γ 2 <γ 2 , in which case (1, 2) (2, 1) for the principal:
the less risky task is put first. The second possibility is γ 2 <γ 2 <γ 2 ; here the optimal ranking would depend on whether (15) or (16) would be satisfied, which is not immediately clear since the increase in β 1 increases the right-hand side of the equality above while the fall inγ 2 simultaneously increases the left-hand side.
Proposition 3 An increase in the riskiness in one task may or may not result in an optimal task ordering where the riskier task goes first.
Positive externality of task i success on β j . Now suppose that, along with the negative externality of task i's failure on the project's overall chance of success, task i also has a positive externality on task j. Specifically, task i's success increases the effectiveness of player j's effort, represented here as β j > β j , Pr (S j | S i ) = β j and Pr (S j | F i ) = β j .
This time, denote the ordering with a contingent plan for the second task by (i, j ) and the ordering without it by (i, j ).
Case A . Given F i , Player j chooses e j = 1 if and only if
The optimal rewards v * satisfy (1 ), (2 ), and (3 ). Player i's expected utility is
Player j's expected utility is less than his utility without a positive externality (compare (5 ) with (5)).
Corollary 3 With positive externalities, the principal that is not employing a contingent plan for the second task may not be indifferent between task orderings. Specifically, with positive externalities EΠ(v * , (1, 2 )) = EΠ(v * , (2, 1 )) if and only if
With a positive externality, player j's is payoff when he exerts effort and succeeds following S i is smaller, but he has a greater chance of receiving this smaller reward (since β j > β j ). The question is whether the change in expected reward decreases profit. We see that
Comment: Suppose rewards are such player i contributes and player j contributes regardless of the history. Then the positive externality increases the principal's profit.
The principal's profit increases because the positive externality, by raising β j to β j following success in task i, (1) increases the expected value of the project, given by the term
and (2) lowers the expected reward paid to player j, resulting in the cost savings
This last expression confirms that
It is also easy to check that
Corollary 4 Suppose the principal incentivizes all players to contribute and, for player j, to contribute regardless of history. Then (1, 2) (2, 1), if
and (2, 1) (1, 2) if
c .
Case B . We now determine the optimal rewards when the principal implements a contingent plan for player j. We assume that v j (·, F j ) = 0. Consider again the subgame G(F i ). As in the
Finally, consider the effort decision of Player i. Player i chooses e i = 1 if and only if
The optimal rewards v * satisfy (7 ), (8 ), and (9 ). Player i's expected utility is
while Player j's expected utility is Eu j (v * , (i, j )) = β i β j v * j (S i , S j ) − c = α j β j β j −α j c < α j β j β j −α j c = Eu j (v * , (i, j)).
The presence of a positive externality decreases the expected utility of player j, although it still allows him some surplus. When might a principal prefer to use a contingent plan for task j? EΠ(v * , (i, j )) > EΠ(v * , (i, j )) if and only if
i.e., γ i < β j c (β j − α j ) 2 v =γ i =γ i .
Lemma 1 The existence of a positive externality of task i on task j does not changeγ i . 
EΠ(v
= EΠ(v * , (i, j )) + ∆ i .
Proposition 4 (Essential & externality) Suppose that there are positive externalities between the two tasks and that EΠ(v * , (1, 2 )) ≥ EΠ(v * , (2, 1 )).
Task ordering can be characterized as follows:
(i) When γ i ≥γ i for i = 1, 2, the optimal ordering is (1, 2 ) if (25) holds strictly, while the optimal ordering is either (1, 2 ) or (2, 1 ) if (25) holds as an equality.
(ii) When γ 1 <γ 1 and γ 2 ≥γ 2 , the optimal ordering is (1, 2 ).
(iii) When γ 1 ≥γ 1 and γ 2 <γ 2 , the optimal ordering is (2, 1 ) if ∆ 2 > EΠ(v * , (1, 2 )) − EΠ(v * , (2, 1 )), either (2, 1 ) or (1, 2 ) if ∆ 2 = EΠ(v * , (1, 2 )) − EΠ(v * , (2, 1 )), and (1, 2 ) if ∆ 2 < EΠ(v * , (1, 2 )) − EΠ(v * , (2, 1 )).
